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Abstract

ABSTRACT
While analyses of “North American integration” after NAFTA continue to stress outdated
notions of country-to-country trade and the exchange of finished products across national
borders, our paper starts from the premise that what we have now is a single, integrated regional
economic system whose expansion has followed the pace and contours of business strategies
emphasizing continentally-integrated supply chains, but whose management via regulatory and
policy coordination has lagged dangerously behind. Most dangerous of all has been the massive
gap between our region’s infrastructure needs – ports, transportation, and borders – and what has
been coordinated and facilitated by the public sector. In this paper we investigate this current
impasse from the point of view of reframing the competition with Asia’s export giants – in
particular China – as an impetus to enhance the competitive edge not of our national economies
but rather of the regional economic system as a whole. We highlight the potential for synergy
between the dynamism of cross-border regions such as the Pacific Northwest and their
“gateway” strategies of coping with booming trade with Asia, on the one hand, and the aim of
enhancing North American regional competitiveness via a more rationalized and effective
continental transportation and infrastructure strategy. For example, British Columbia’s plans to
expand the Prince Rupert port facility, or the West Coast Corridor Coalition’s plans for
transportation links “from B.C. [British Columbia] to B.C. [Baja California]” would do well to
explore their potential to connect with developing transportation networks and trade corridors in
the center of the continent, as well as emerging export centers on the Eastern seaboard
(Halifax/Atlantica), and on Mexico’s Pacific coast. In keeping with North America’s unique
integration pattern – decentralized and business-driven – this focus on cross-border regions and
public-private partnerships could bridge the infrastructure gap, linking local concerns with
greater continental prosperity.

i

Introduction

INTRODUCTION: THE NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The conventional map of NAFTA shows three separate countries that trade with each
other. We are told this is the world’s largest trade bloc, with the world’s largest trading
relationship. This map is misleading. To be sure, North America is still comprised of three
national governments, but the North American economy is no longer best visualized as three
national economies. Rather it has evolved and is continuing to evolve as a deeply integrated
continental system of stocks and flows, structured by linkages among production clusters and
distribution hubs across the continent – linkages that rest on cross-border alignments among
business, communities and local and state-provincial governments.
Consequently, the three North American nations are not just trading partners, and what
flows across their mutual borders are not mainly finished goods. Instead, their firms collaborate
in complex, cross-border production, supply and distribution systems, some focused within
specific cross-border regions, and many more connecting those regions across the continent,
effectively forming a single tri-national production platform. For example, one quarter of the
approximately $1.25 billion in goods that cross our two internal borders daily is automotive, but
rather than selling cars to one another, we in North America build cars together. Within the
North American region we also share increasingly integrated energy markets; use the same roads
and railroads to transport jointly made products to market; service the same customers with an
array of financial services; fly on the same integrated airline networks; and increasingly meet the
same or similar standards of professional practice. The cumulative result of cross border trade
and investment is for most practical purposes an integrated economy such that local practice in
one part of the region accounts for results in another part of the region. This is what economists
call “deep” or structural integration.
To hear North American integration described as “deep” would surprise many skeptics in
the academic community, particularly those whose conceptualizations of regional economic
integration (REI) are based upon Europe as the model and the measure of the phenomenon.
While it is true that the NAFTA agreement itself purposefully eschewed a top-down
institutionalized approach and rejected policies such as a common currency, a regional
parliament, and other identity-building exercises, we would argue that North America represents
a different, alternative model of REI based upon three main pillars: entrepreneurialism,
decentralization, and (associated with the former two) adaptation. NAFTA was itself not the
starting point of regional integration on our continent: by the late 1980s, when Mexico’s
government accelerated trade liberalization and the US and Canada were negotiating their
bilateral Free Trade Agreement, corporate strategies and investment decisions in all three
countries were already shifting towards a regional, rather than simply national, perspective.1
Particularly influential was the end of the “branch plant” model based upon protectionist barriers
to investment in Canada and Mexico, a model which also saddled U.S. companies with excess
capacity at a time of tougher international competition and falling profit margins. Canadian
1

In the early 1990s, several key surveys of managers of US firms with long-established operations in Canada and
Mexico indicated that the US-Canada FTA and NAFTA had simply intensified trends already underway towards
continental-wide corporate strategies and organizations. See Stephen Krajewski, “Multinational Firms Across the
Canada-U.S. Border: An Investigation of Intrafirm Trade and Other Activities,” (Ottawa: Conference Board of
Canada, 1992); Jerry Haar and Stephen Blank, Making NAFTA Work: U.S. Firms and the New North American
Business Environment (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
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firms, always concerned about market access and access to larger pools of capital, found greater
incentives to look south, while the end of “corporate welfare” with the dismantling of
institutionalized protectionism in Mexico also chastened its previously risk-averse private sector
and gave impetus to export orientation and the search for joint ventures.2 Even before NAFTA,
and to an increasing extent after, intra-firm trade exploded, and just-in-time cross-border
production, supply and distribution strategies further enhanced the efficiency and efficacy of
North American business.
The cumulative result of all this cross-border trade and investment has been, for most
practical purposes, the development of an integrated regional economy based upon a degree of
collaboration and complementarity between countries that is unprecedented. But most notably, it
is integration that has been driven “bottom-up” by businesses looking for new ways to expand
and survive, and its evolution has been uneven and to some extent invisible on the national radar
screens because it has accelerated in particular cross-border regions, moved along with help by
adaptive and, in their own way, entrepreneurial subnational governments (i.e., local and
state/provincial jurisdictions) enjoying relative autonomy within all three federalist systems.
Freed – or, from a somewhat different political perspective, unleashed – from top-down
government projects and planning, North American integration has deepened in an uneven,
market-driven, de facto manner while sidestepping the paralyzing political battles over
sovereignty that an attempt to adopt a European system would certainly have set off.
While advocates of North American integration may have celebrated such an “under the
radar” approach in the past, the challenge of expanding trade and competition with Asia raises
the question regarding whether “North America, Inc.” can continue down this market-based,
decentralized adaptive path into the future. While business was pretty much able to retool itself
in the 1980s, today’s new challenges reveal what the limits to bottom-up growth, specifically
having to do with issues such as transportation, border infrastructure, and regulation. It is both
the scale of China’s export push (helped along with the expiration of the multifibre agreement)
and the technological leaps made in transoceanic shipping that have raised concerns regarding
the sorry state of North America’s ports, railways, and roads. But such concerns naturally
invoke the need of public authorities to take key investment decisions (whether public or publicprivate or privatized) regarding these key nodes of municipal, state/provincial, and national
infrastructure that now must serve trinational or regional economic interests. Specifically, if
North America is to “stay alive” and remain competitive in today’s global markets – by which
we mean not a “Fortress North America” exclusionary strategy, but rather a strategy that seeks to
attract both investment and trade from dynamic Asian economies by maximizing the competitive
advantage of North America as a site of production, consumer markets, and innovation – the
moment of truth has arrived regarding the unsexy but essential issue of the health and
maintenance of the “plumbing” of the North American economic system.
This paper presents an overview of this issue, first arguing that the architecture of North
American supply chains – based upon corporate adaptations featuring their innovative use of
transportation and logistics networks – has shifted from being the leading edge of the region’s
competitiveness in the past two decades to being the leading edge of its vulnerability in a number
2

For more on business adaptation in Mexico, see Strom C. Thacker, Big Business, the State, and Free Trade:
Constructing Coalitions in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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of ways. Specifically, we argue that the regional economic system has reached the limits to
“bottom-up” growth, and now requires a more integrated North American transportation strategy
in order to adapt to an increasingly competitive global market environment. The next section of
the paper then focuses on North America’s growing trade with Asia, and discusses why and how
Asia has become the focal point for broader discussions of North American competitiveness.
The following section looks at how the cross-border region within NAFTA most obviously
affected by these new trading patterns – namely, the Pacific Northwest – has adapted to these
forces, and why this matters greatly for the entire North American economic system. Finally, the
concluding section identifies a coming crisis point in North American transportation
infrastructure, and argues for regions like the Pacific Northwest, which stands at the leading edge
of our continent’s move towards a new level of competitiveness, to rethink their particular
interests as North American interests, and for stakeholder groups and their leaders to use those
kinds of arguments with greater energy and precision, both to persuade their own constituents
and to seek allies farther afield, continentally speaking. With those coalitions in place, the kind
of North American thinking and policymaking that will be required to confront, and overcome,
the transportation crisis may have a fighting chance.
NAFTA SUPPLY CHAINS: SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
For many North American firms, a significant competitive advantage rests upon their
capacity to build networks and supply chains that link regional specializations across national
borders. For example, the North American auto supply chain stretches from parts manufactures
in Mexico, through plants in the US to assembly operations in Canada. Components, parts and
ultimately finished autos move along this extended production system. This is the case with
virtually all of our leading companies, ranging from automotive products to aircraft components,
to computers, to chemicals, to food products, housing products, pharmaceuticals, industrial
goods such as subcomponents of manufacturing systems, as well as commodities and raw
materials of every description.
See Appendix, Table 1
The ability to operate these networks efficiently depends on transportation and logistics
capacities. In a world of just-in-time production systems, transportation infrastructure and
supply chain management become absolutely critical elements of business success – and even
survival. Advantages of location and service costs are multiplied by sophisticated control and
optimization techniques aided by extensive use of GSP (Geo-Service Providing) and RFID
(Radio Frequency Identification) technologies designed to monitor shipments at great distances.
Clearly, then, the transportation, logistics, and border capacities have become the nerves
and sinews of the North American economy. Like most of NAFTA, it is an emergent reality
arising from millions of decisions starting with consumer demand and moving backward along
the supply chain to bring about a substantial re-orientation of transportation networks in North
America, from predominantly East-West (or West-East) to now North-South as well as EastWest. However, today’s resulting geography of ports and flows reflect a new balance: that
between the land-based, North-South NAFTA trade flows and the newer shipping-based EastWest flows of the new, inter-regional face of globalization: the boom of trade with Asia. This
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new balance between NAFTA trade and global markets is concentrated along the US borders and
coastal regions plus some large cities.
See Appendix, Map
On the one hand, this, too, represents significant adaptation. This adaptation has been so
good, in fact, that the volume of shipments is now hitting the limits of the system, specifically
the limits of port technology and capacity, of rail capacity, and of infrastructure aging. Unlike
the first round of NAFTA adaptation, however, more than simply private sector strategic
adaptation is now required. What is needed, it appears, is a more effective continental
transportation infrastructure that is adequate to the challenge of melding the NAFTA and global
flows. The question hanging over governments, entrepreneurs, and other ‘stakeholders’ in
NAFTA-dependent and trade-dependent communities in our region, therefore, is whether the
North American economic system can evolve to accommodate that challenge. By themselves,
and by design, the three NAFTA national governments lack the formal mechanisms of
cooperation, coordination, and, most importantly, implementation in order to launch the kinds of
region-wide infrastructure projects that the European Union has successfully used to facilitate the
movement of goods into, out of, and within its single market. Therefore, we should not have
been surprised that the increase in volumes of goods flowing across North America’s internal
borders outran the capacity of our roads, bridges, railroads and border crossings even before
9/11. Today, North America’s transportation and border infrastructure barely suffice to support
our economy; and given the obstacles to regional policy coordination, there is little margin left
for future expansion.
To be sure, one can argue that what is lacking is not simply institutionalized channels for
cooperation, but also political will. In practice, however, while governmental prioritizing can
lead to the creation of new institutionalized channels, their effective coordination and operation
is not a foregone conclusion. Here, the management of North America’s internal borders since
9-11 provides an instructive example. No one can dispute that, following the terrorist attacks in
2001 – though, perhaps, for different domestic, bilateral and global reasons – border security has
become a top priority for all three governments. Indeed, substantial efforts have been made to
improve the physical infrastructure at border crossings in the past five years. The US-Canada
“Smart Border” agreement and the parallel agreement with Mexico represent key commitments
to improve border management. Various organizations and border communities have initiated
dialogues with government agencies that have achieved significant incremental improvement in
border processes. Programs such as FAST and NEXUS also were developed and expanded to
demonstrate that governments were doing their best to ensure security against terrorist threats
without unduly interfering with cross-border commerce. However, in practice there has been
much that remains to be done, and the process as well as the disappointing outcome point to the
disjuncture between the rhetoric of governmental prioritization and the reality of institutional
confusion. The pyramiding of requirements and programs, each of which can inhibit quick
border processing, and all of which together require high degrees of inter-agency coordination
(and typically involve federal, state and even local governments) as well as new levels of
cooperation with business and border communities, has created tumult in some instances and
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threatens what Stephen Flynn calls “a potential train wreck”3 Thus, even at the geographic place
where North American regional interests would have the greatest salience, and in a high-priority
issue area for all three governments – and, arguably, publics – the ability to forge a North
American solution to a North American problem remains elusive.
Considerably less attention has been paid to developing a sense of a North American
transportation and logistics structure; instead, rhetoric has run high, while vested interests have
controlled the policy process to the detriment of greater national and North American interests.
People have talked about “NAFTA Superhighways” for a decade, and it has been clear since the
mid-1980s that increased volumes of goods flowing north and south demand new approaches to
transportation infrastructure. Washington has spent vast sums in a series of highway funding
bills since 1991 to identify and improve “high priority corridors” that would facilitate northsouth trade. However, these funds became a pot into which every member of Congress dipped
his/her fingers. The number of designated high priority corridors soared as members earmarked
funds for their own favored projects.
See Appendix, Table 2
The result is that the map of so-called “high priority corridors” looks like a plate of
spaghetti. Highways and border crossings have been improved here and there, but there is no
movement toward developing a true North American highway system. Certainly nothing like the
super multimodal corridors, wired with fiber-optics and the latest digital frills, has come about. If
anything, the general state of US highways has deteriorated over the past decade. In its latest
“Report Card,” the American Society of Civil Engineers awards the American government a Dfor maintaining existing roads and bridges. The US is $40 billion behind just in maintaining
existing roads.4 Add to this the challenge of bringing Mexico’s roads into the 21st century; the
joint project of fixing crumbling bridges and overburdened access points across both internal
borders; the need to construct “inland ports” to connect incoming containers to both rail and
road routes towards the North American interior and beyond; and the continued distortions of
local “pork-driven” incentives, and the outlook for trinational regional coordination on this
critical issue starts to look decidedly bleak.
NORTH AMERICAN TRADE WITH ASIA
At this point, it is important to recall that the outlook for the future of the pre-NAFTA
North American economies in the early 1980s was also decidedly bleak – given stagflation in the
US, the debt crisis in Mexico, and the collapse of oil prices affecting both Canada and Mexico
(and their respective experiments with protectionist economic policies). But it was at this time,
facing this bleak picture, that businesses in the US, Mexico and Canada responded by retooling
and revamping their corporate strategies, and began to make use of innovations in technology
and supply-chain management techniques to bring us the North American economic system we
have today. In the past few years, echoing the shock of the early ’80s, fears of the onslaught of
3

See Stephen Flynn, “The False Conundrum: Continental Integration Versus Homeland Security,” in Peter Andreas
and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security
Context (Routledge, New York & London, 2003)
4
American Society of Civil Engineers (http://www.asce.org/reportcard/index.cfm?reaction=full&page=6#roads)
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Chinese cheap manufactures have produced a similar sense of dread, most notably in Mexico,
which had thought that NAFTA guaranteed it a preferential market for these low-value added
exports. But there has also been a more positive shock to the North American economic system
from Asia: the inflow of investment from China matching the historic inflows from Japan,
coupled with China’s hunger for raw materials plentiful in all three NAFTA countries, arguably
have opened up a range of opportunities for the region to attract the business of this new global
economic superpower. Indeed, the challenge to North America’s competitive advantage as a
region is not necessarily whether we can outproduce and outsell China or Asia per se, but
whether we can adapt effectively to the new global environment, which would ideally mean the
inclusion of North America into rapidly expanding and dynamic globalized production networks
that encompass our own businesses and those of Asia.
There has been some recent evidence that this theme of regional (vs. national) “North
American competitiveness” has some traction in the halls of power in all three NAFTA countries
as a potential organizing principle for a new phase of post-NAFTA integration. Three recent
reports speak directly to the issue of North American competitiveness. The first, entitled
“Building a North American Community,” was drafted by a Task Force sponsored by the
Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, and
the Council on Foreign Relations.5 The second was the “Report to Leaders, Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America,” presented in June 2005 by the three NAFTA nations’
foreign ministers in compliance with the stated goal of the Waco trilateral leaders’ summit to
produce a set of goals for the new SPP (including a timetable for incremental steps) within 90
days of the summit meeting.6 Both of these reports underline the need to press forward in
building a seamless North American economic system as the foundation for prosperous and
growing US, Canadian, and Mexican communities in the 21st century. However, the third report,
the most recent Report to Leaders submitted by the “Security” and “Prosperity” ministers of the
three governments in August 2006, goes one step further, and announces the creation of what is
called a “North American Competitiveness Council,” adopting the new buzzword of
competitiveness for the name of what is to be the main consultative body of the private sector to
the SPP process.7
And although the SPP’s stated aims do maintain a distinctly nation-based outlook that
belies a zero-sum view of “competitiveness” (i.e., implying that the goal is to give North
American businesses an edge to “beat out” businesses from other regions), the global nature of
so many North American businesses which are to be the main “stakeholders” for the SPP augurs
5

Building a North American Community: Report of the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), also available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8102. The Task
Force Chairs were John Manley, Pedro Aspe, and William Weld; Vice-Chairs, Thomas d’Aquino, Andres Rosental,
and Robert Pastor. This report was released prior to the trilateral leaders’ summit at Waco, Texas, on March 23,
2005.
6
The report, dated June 27, 2005, and its detailed appendices outlining the “Security” and “Prosperity” agendas and
the timetable for meeting incremental goals in each, are available at
http://www.spp.gov/report_to_leaders/index.asp.
7
See Report to Leaders, August 2006, available at http://www.spp.gov/2006_report_to_leaders/index.asp. The
initiative for the NACC was first announced at the trinational leaders’ summit in Cancún, Mexico, on March 31,
2006, the first attended by newly-elected Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper. For the names of the
Canadian members, see the press release on Prime Minister Harper’s official site, June 13, 2006,
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1200.
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for a push to make the region attractive for both trade and investment. Looking now a year later,
while SPP has been virtually invisible in the public eye, its working groups have been quietly
moving ahead on a few of its more ambitious goals, such as a North American steel strategy via
a new North American Steel Trade Committee (NASTC).8 And in the area of transportation, the
SPP’s “Prosperity” agenda includes the goals of “improv[ing] the safety and efficiency of North
America’s transportation system by expanding market access, facilitating multimodal corridors,
reducing congestion, and alleviating bottlenecks at the border.”9 Indeed, the US Department of
Transportation (DOT) lists as its participation in SPP 11 proposed projects under nine separate
sub-agencies, including a US-Mexico Mass Transit Border Project, joint rail inspections, a North
American Transportation Statistics Interchange, and a project on short sea shipping.10
While the active participation of numerous government agencies and the promises of
trinational cooperation are encouraging, the question becomes whether the pressure on the
region’s infrastructure coming from the Asian trade boom will be enough to push ahead the more
continental, multi-modal approach to transportation that is needed at this time. There is still a
need to develop trinational statistics which can then be used as a vehicle for two key
policymaking priorities: weighing alternative means to expand North American port capacity
and judging how much new capacity may be required under different economic scenarios. It is
not at all clear that enough mid-level public servants, let alone leaders in the policymaking
process, have begun to think either in continental terms or in network centric multi-modal terms.
Specifically, possibly because of the continued political “third rail” of sovereignty,11 projects that
hint at tri-partite harmonization of highway policies have gotten little public airing, despite their
patent rationality. Reducing inter-modal switching costs and generating ways to ensure flow
optimization end to end among all transportation modes are also key to coping with new global
flows, which are mostly containerized and need to be transported inland in the most costeffective (and safest) way. Improving competitiveness for the continent requires more attention
to multi-modal transport, rather than thinking of transportation as separate silos – rail, road,
water, air. But perhaps most profoundly, this new challenge will require stakeholders in the
public and private sectors to view the North American economic system as a whole that is not
only greater than the sum of its parts, but is also critically dependent upon the dynamic – and

8

See North American Steel Trade Committee (NASTC), “North American Steel Strategy,” available at
http://www.spp.gov/pdf/NASTC_steel_strategy.pdf.
9
See U.S. Department of Commerce, “Security and Prosperity Partnership,” available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/S3/sppcover.htm.
10
See U.S. Department of Commerce, “DOT Security & Prosperity Partnership of North America Initiatives,”
available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/S-3/sppinitiatives.htm
11
For example, the SPP’s official U.S. site includes a “Myth vs. Fact” section which seeks to dispel ideas about the
SPP (presumably present in the U.S. public’s mind) such as: “the SPP is a movement to merge the United States,
Mexico and Canada into a North American Union and establish a common currency,” “the SPP infringes on the
sovereignty of the United States,” and “the SPP creates a NAFTA-plus legal status between the three countries.”
See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), “Myth vs. Fact,” available at
http://www.spp.gov/myths_vs_facts.asp. Canadian and Mexican popular and political concerns about sovereignty
vis à vis the United States are also deeply rooted historically and arguably held in check a century of North-South
economic integration before their policies started shifting in the 1980s. See Stephanie R. Golob, “Beyond the Policy
Frontier: Canada, Mexico, and the Ideological Origins of NAFTA,” World Politics 55 (April 2003): 361-398.

7

Staying Alive: North American Competitiveness

above all, efficient – interchange among its constituent regions, clusters, and supply chain
locations. Thus, the development of transportation infrastructure in one subregion, such as the
expansion of ports in the Pacific Northwest with an eye to the expanding trade with Asia, is not
merely a vehicle for expanding bilateral trade between the US or Canada and China; it is – or can
be – an investment in the infrastructure that will permit the whole North American continental
region to consolidate and expand economic competitiveness in this era of global trade and
production.
GATEWAY TO ASIA, OR TO NOWHERE:
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST IN NORTH AMERICA
In his influential book on Ontario as a “North American region-state,” Thomas
Courchene challenged us to rethink the economic geography of our continent, and the role
played by our subnational political units in our national economies, and in a larger continental
system. As Courchene observes: “It is not just that nearly all Canada’s provinces are more
integrated (in terms of exports) internationally than east-west, but also that Canada’s regions,
which in some cases would incorporate more than one province, are economically/industrially
quite distinct from one another. … This means that it is time to view Canada as a series of northsouth, cross-border economies with quite distinct industrial structures.”12 More recently,
journalistic attention has been focused on “Mexamerica,” or “Amexica,” the borderlands that
span the US-Mexican border, as either possessing or developing a distinct economic and cultural
space,13 while scholarly and policy attention has raised the profile of what Canada’s Policy
Research Initiative (PRI) has identified as North America’s “cross-border regions,” which are
characterized primarily by “substantial economic links, socio-cultural similarities, and the
presence of cross-border organization.”14 What this last definition highlights, and what we are
arguing in this paper, is that while the functional necessity of cooperation has driven North
American integration across national borders, it is the quality and quantity of organization – the
formal and informal mechanisms allowing local and vested interests in both the public and
private sectors to advance common regional interests – that holds the key to its optimization.
That is, while British Columbia is closely tied economically with Washington and Oregon, and
may share social and cultural characteristics, what will ultimately matter for its own future
competitiveness, and its contribution to North American competitiveness, will be as much
political will as economic muscle.
As trade from Asia booms and transportation infrastructure is pressed to its limits, the
need to organize and cooperate on issues of cross-border interest has become all the more
pressing for the states and provinces in the Pacific Northwest zone, known more romantically as
“Cascadia” (which hints at a secessionist spirit) and more bureaucratically as the Pacific
12

Thomas J. Courchene with Colin R. Telmer, From Heartland to North American Region States; The Social,
Fiscal and Federal Evolution of Ontario (Monograph Series on Public Policy, Centre for Public Management,
University of Toronto, 1998), p. 289.
13
The former was featured in Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981);
the latter was preferred by The Economist in its survey of Mexico in the early days of NAFTA. See “Welcome to
Amexica! A Survey of Mexico.” The Economist (October 28, 1995).
14
See Policy Research Initiative, North American Linkages Project, “Briefing Note: Canada-U.S. Relations and the
Emergence of Cross-Border Regions” (February 2006), available at
http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/XBorder_BN_e.pdf.
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Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). It is this latter grouping which will be the focus of this
section, as PNWER represents precisely what PRI’s definition had in mind in terms of matching
economic interest with organization. PNWER, a public-private partnership, began its life as the
Pacific NorthWest Legislative Leadership Forum (PNLLF) in 1989, and by 1991 PNWER in its
present form was established by statute in Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington
State on the U.S. side, and Alberta, British Columbia, and Yukon on the Canadian side.15 Its
sophisticated governance structure includes the premiers and state governors, as well as a
number of standing Working Groups, among them groups on Transportation (est. 1993), Export
(1994; renamed Trade and Finance in 1997), and Agriculture (1995). As of 1994 the Working
Groups have been directed by a Private Sector Council, adding a dimension of consultation and
information exchange with public sector/elected officials.16 Not surprisingly, PNWER -- “with
its 17 different working groups and memberships that include premiers, governors, legislators,
counties, economic development commissions, industry associations, and private sector
members”17 – is cited in the PRI report as evidence of how the “thickness and intensity” of crossborder relations is greatest in the Northwest region.18
With all of this organizational sophistication, it is not surprising that PNWER’s list of
accomplishments impresses. Particularly notable have been its efforts across a variety of
working group areas to improve the exchange of information and the generation of binational
statistics in order to improve policy planning, most notably in its Environmental Technology
Working Group and its Export (now Trade and Investment) Working Group. Another hallmark
of PNWER’s efforts which speaks to the ability to frame issues regionally (cross-border) is what
might be called its diplomatic work. For example, in the thorny bilateral zone of confrontation
known as softwood lumber, back in 1994 PNWER’s Forest Products Working Group (at the
request of British Columbia) worked towards the drafting of a set of common forestry principles
which could serve as a reference for the region. Finally, it bears noting that, while PNWER has
not been in operation even two decades, its relative longevity among North American crossborder regional organizations gives it influence with both national governments as what the PRI
has called a “laboratory for policy innovation,” citing PNWER’s role in developing the NEXUS
program;19 and among more recent arrivals to the cross-border region community (such as the
Desert Pacific Region spanning the Mexico-U.S. border20), both as a model and as an active
advisor.
In the area of transportation, however, PNWER’s most recent activities have been hardly
innovative. In its Transportation Working Group’s submission of Resolutions and Actions
Points for their 2006 annual meeting, the topics included moving forward with the Pacific
Gateway Strategy,21 though no specific proposals are offered; better communication with other
15

Unless otherwise indicated, information on PNWER is available on the PNWER website, http://www.pnwer.org.
For a detailed chronology of what PNWER identifies as its “History of Accomplishments,” see
http://pnwer.org/background/accomplishments.htm.
16
See “PNWER: History,” available at http://pnwer.org/background/history2.htm.
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PRI, “Briefing Note,” p. 4.
Ibid., p. 5.
19
Ibid., p. 6.
20
For the legislation, see http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/desertpacificeconomic.htm
21
For Transport Canada’s press release on the Pacific Gateway Strategy, see
http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2005/05-gc013e.htm
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working groups; generic calls for greater attention to North-South cross-border transportation,
particularly given the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver; and the decision to draft a letter of support
to the Canadian government for a specific policy initiative.22 Where the innovation, or
dynamism, seems to have been concentrated most recently, not surprisingly, is in the area of
infrastructure security: PNWER has sponsored a Partnership for Regional Infrastructure Security
(PRIS, launched in October 2001), launched a Puget Sound Partnership for Regional
Infrastructure Security in line with the PRIS model, and participates in the Blue Cascades
exercises designed to study “critical infrastructure interdependencies.”23 All of these initiatives
are arguably of utmost importance to the citizens of the PNWER region, and reflect their vital
concerns regarding terrorist threats and emergency response. On the US side, they also reflect
the real need for regions and local communities to compete for limited Department of Homeland
Security funding. But the lack of a comprehensive transportation vision – even one that is
overly-ambitious, such as the one presented by the Cascadia Project’s Bruce Agnew and Bruce
Chapman in their recent policy paper on corridors24 – speaks to the danger that PNWER has
become very much like any American special interest group, which is responsive to its
constituency’s narrow concerns rather than articulating a broader view of how their constituents
will benefit into the future as a part of a continental economic system. As we have mentioned
earlier, North America’s vast and daunting transportation challenge cannot be met without the
identification of, and energizing of, a community of North American “stakeholders” who will see
and press for the kinds of innovations that will overcome local rivalries and vested interests to
make the region’s transportation network efficient and its continental economy attractive to
exporters, importers, and investors, both in Asia and around the globe. What the PNWER
example shows is that sophisticated organizations, such as public-private partnerships, are only
part of the answer to how cross-border regions can contribute to improving future North
American competitiveness. The other part lies in leadership – by individuals and organizations,
mayors and oilmen, consumer groups and small-town exporters – who “get it” and can persuade
others that they have “North American interests” in transportation.
Moreover, as part of a post-Asian boom strategy, there is a need for greater innovation in
terms of how cross-border regions identify themselves within the continental economic system,
another challenge for leadership. New or expanded ports, like the one proposed for Prince Rupert
in British Columbia, must be conceived of not as simply a “gateway” between Canada and Asia,
but rather as the interchange point of containers into – and outward from -- the North American
economy. A Pacific Gateway Strategy that speeds the inward flow of Asian containers at a new
Prince Rupert Port facility only to see them dumped in the Chicago rail yards would scarcely be
a victory. The point is that Vancouver, Montreal, and Halifax can also be viewed – and view
themselves – as North American ports, each of which could then be expanded to expedite larger
flows of goods not only into Canada, but to the US and, quite possibly, Mexico. To benefit the

22

PNWER, “Transportation Action Points/Resolutions,” summarized and available for download at
http://pnwer.dataweb.com/resolutions.view.
23
See http://pnwer.org/pris.index.htm
24
See Bruce Agnew and Bruce Chapman, “How Do We Get To There From Here? A Transportation Future for the
Puget Sound Region,” Cascadia – The Discovery Institute (no date), available at http://www.cascadiaproject.org
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local communities as well as the rest of North America into the future, port development must be
seen in context of continental trade flows with Asia and in context of a continental transport
system.
“Inland ports” are also important in this strategy, both because of their obvious virtue of
decongesting their related maritime ports, and because they can aid in homeland security
screening. But there is also a North American advantage, as inland ports can transform
themselves into continental hubs. Here, the key players are likely to be cities, and their main
vehicle will be the trade corridor movement. North America’s trade corridors can be formed
along highways, or combine road and rail; many are made up of geographically contiguous sites
connected North-South, though some of the more innovative ones have been formed through a
creative reimagining of geographic location. Kansas City, Missouri, for example, has done just
that, transforming itself from a modest Midwestern hub and the home of the “Mexiplex,” a
building housing the Kansas City-Mexico Business Development Corporation, as well as trade
desks for various Mexican cities and states.25 Kansas City officials have also entered into talks
with Winnipeg, to bring the Canadian presence there as a way to underscore their North
American regional strategy. In the Pacific Northwest, there has been a trade corridor movement;
indeed, back in 1999, PNWER, together with the Cascadia Project, launched the Inland
Corridors Project.26 In 2001, the West Coast Corridor Coalition (WCCC) then sought funding
for an outreach initiative, to extend the corridor, “From B.C. to B.C.,” meaning British Columbia
in Canada to Baja California in Mexico, and north to Alaska.27 This project, funded by the US
DOT, potentially covered 1,500 miles of the West Coast that has become critically congested
(approximately half of all container cargo transits through West Coast ports) and where the
burden of this congestion (environmental, employment, etc,) has fallen on local communities.
Like PNWER, and in all likelihood following its model, the WCCC is a public-private
partnership, with a private sector advisory group, that has a somewhat broader view
geographically and yet a more narrow view as a trade and transportation corridor. However,
because of the economic clout of this expanded, trinational corridor in an age of booming Asian
trade, the WCCC has a better chance of attracting federal government attention, possibly through
the SPP. But to truly impact North American competitiveness, this North-South group will need
to look East-West within North America as well, looking for ways to line up support for better
road and rail links between its ports (maritime and inland) and the heartland of the US, for
example, or connecting Alaska and northern British Columbia with eastern Canada via Midwest
US or Canadian “hubs.” This North American strategy, rather than the “cross-border region”
approach, may be the way the Pacific Northwest can best leverage its geography for its own
benefit, while benefiting the North American regional economy more broadly.

25

Kansas City, International Affairs and Trade Office, “The Mexiplex: What We Do,”
http://www.kcmo.org/international.nsf/web/tradedesk
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PNWER, History of Accomplishments, Transportation Work Group, at
http://pnwer.org/background/accomplishments.htm.
27
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Bruce Agnew, “From B.C. to B.C….and Beyond,” presentation to the 15 Annual Meeting of the Pacific
Northwest Economic Region, Westin Hotel, Seattle, Washington, July 14-18, 2005. Available at
http://www.pnwer.org/meetings/Summer2005/Presentations/Trns1/Trns1_Agnew_WCCC.pdf#search=%22west%2
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THE COMING CRISIS POINT IN NORTH AMERICA’S
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Transportation provides a particularly important example of the need for thinking in
North American terms. Despite the enormous sums that have been spent on roads in the past
decade, and despite the fact that there are many people and institutes involved in transportation
issues, there is still have little sense of what a North American transportation system might look
like. Many specialists agree that we are approaching a major decision point in the North
American economic system.
Unlike Europe’s experience where governments played a much larger initiating role,
building the North American economic system has been very much a bottom-up process, driven
by corporate strategies and structures. NAFTA can be seen as a response by governments to
developments already underway in the North American economy – as efforts to bring regulatory
frameworks into line with this emerging economic system. We have now reached the limits to
bottom-up integration. Decisions on vital issues like transportation and borders – and on energy
and immigration -- must be made, based upon more sophisticated conceptualizations of what
“North American” options would best serve our continent’s interests in these sectors.
Policymakers and stakeholders alike have to think outside of their local, national, and sectoral
boxes, to consider what a North American economic system might look like in 10 or 20 or 50
years, and how they could best benefit from its future consolidation. But most of all, given the
weak institutional framework provided by the NAFTA accord itself and the growing recognition
that the private sector cannot simply adapt its way towards this next level of efficiency, there has
to be a rigorous, fair, effective, clear-sighted, and transparent process through which these
decisions can be made. Among the many questions to be answered are:
• Should we seek to improve Long Beach-LA port capacity or open access to Mexico’s
deep-water Pacific ports?
• Should we improve highway connections across the US-Canada and US-Mexico borders
or should we look for ways to increase rail coverage?
• If a new post-Panamax port is built at Prince Rupert, how can 8 or 10,000 containers be
moved efficiently to the main North American hubs given limited road and rail capacity
in Western Canada?
• What about short sea shipping corridors along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts?
How much would this relieve land congestion?
Unfortunately, no agency or organization has been mandated to come up with answers to
questions such as these, nor is there any blueprint for how a “North American” transportation
strategy would be implemented. There are very few historical examples of successful
transportation policies in the US and Canada, though the successes did play an outsized role in
both countries’ aims of building national economies (in the case of Canada, designed specifically
to create an East-West orientation to counterbalance the North-South ties deemed dangerous to
the integrity of the nation). Building a “national road” was a key (though unfulfilled) objective
in the early days of the United States, while President Lincoln took the lead in building a
transcontinental railroad. Canada built the Trans-Canada highway and railroad, the latter the
centerpiece of Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald’s push for national unity (and his own
political legacy) in the late nineteenth century. In the US, President Eisenhower was able to build
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the Interstate system a half century ago. What can we learn from these experiences? More
specifically, can we learn from these experiences how to link ourselves together in an open
regional economic system, one which depends upon the open circulation of goods up and down
supply chains, and that is not aiming for political unity or to keep trade out, but to compete for
the flows of trade and the economic prosperity they promise?
These unanswered questions, and the issues of infrastructure investment they reflect, may
not seem as pressing as the more newsworthy threats to our security, but for the future of
economic competitiveness of our region the stakes could not be higher. The weakening of our
transportation infrastructure will limit our ability to compete in global markets in coming
decades and will give overseas competitors with access to more modern and efficient
transportation systems a substantial advantage. Inadequate transportation infrastructure also
limits the growth of particular North American regions. The inadequacies of Mexico’s physical
infrastructure are well known, particularly in the south. Meanwhile, similar problems affect the
Atlantic Provinces, which, along with northern New England, are in danger of being left behind
as a “geographic backwater” in the new North American economic system.28 But as we have
seen, the problem also extends to a region like the Pacific Northwest, less from a point of view of
relative backwardness (though there certainly are poor rural and lumber areas in Washington
State and British Columbia), and more from the inability of aging and inadequate infrastructure
to keep pace with the explosion of Asian trade, making the region a victim of its own success in
a manner of speaking. In this paper, we have argued that what needs to change is not only
funding and organization of those who seek to improve the state of North America’s
transportation infrastructure, but also the mindset. There needs to be a recognition that a region
like the Pacific Northwest, which perhaps stands to gain the most from the boom in the Asian
economies, is also bearing a burden for our entire continental economic system as its
transportation system reaches its limits. Cross-border regional groups and trade corridor
coalitions can play a vital role in this process, but it must be one with a broader vision than
merely to survive or to line their own nests. Their strongest argument for (bi-, or even tri-)
national attention to their plight is not that they are special, but rather that they are not – that is,
to take that next leap in global competitiveness, the entire North American transportation system
needs an overhaul, and this would be a great place to start.
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